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I argue that the economic success of Botswana can be explained by the historical 
development of its institutions which is related to the trajectory of the Tswana states 
over the past 200 years. These institutions created a much more stable and accountable 
government than elsewhere in Africa after independence with the desire and incentive to 
adopt good economic policies. There are two main lessons from this experience. The 
first is how successful an African economy can become using simple orthodox   
well-understood policies. The second is that successful development in Africa will be 
helped by a focus on the development of state institutions. Though Botswana inherited 
different institutions from elsewhere, it also built on these, in particular trying to create 
a national identity and to continually modernize and adapt institutions. There are many 
lessons for other African countries from these policy choices. 
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1 Introduction 
Botswana is a land-locked, ecologically marginal country. Though like many Sub-
Saharan African countries it is made up of a mosaic of different tribes, the dominant 
factor has been the Tswana states which migrated into the territory in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century. The paramount chiefs of the Tswana states who ruled the 
area in the 19th century, were recognized by the British in their institutions of indirect 
rule and most Botswana nationals today still acknowledge membership of one of these 
eight ‘tribal’ state identities.1 As these states expanded, they brought many other groups 
under their control, though the dominant group within each traditional state was 
Tswana. Except among the Tawana of Ngamiland in the northwest, most non-Tswana 
groups were left in their own wards with their own chiefs subordinate to the Tswana 
rulers.  
From the mid nineteenth century, Botswana was sandwiched between the expanding 
Boer states of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, the British Empire, the 
expansionism of Cecil Rhodes and the British South African Company, and the 
Germans in south-west Africa (Namibia). After becoming a British protectorate in 1885, 
it was severely neglected. The protectorate was administered first from Vryberg and 
then Mafeking in South Africa and the only interest of the British was to maintain order, 
collect the hut tax and balance the books. As late as the 1930s, over 50 per cent of 
protectorate expenditures were on the police. Until the 1950s the presumption was that 
Bechuanaland would be incorporated into the Union of South Africa. 
At independence in 1966m there were practically no surfaced roads and only two 
secondary schools in the entire country which dated only from the 1940s. The country 
was as poor as any place in the world. Yet as is well-known, in a continent where many 
countries are poorer now than at independence, Botswana stands out for its 
extraordinary economic record (Table 1), and has experienced very rapid economic 
growth and living standards since 1966. 
Botswana has not just experienced rapid economic growth since independence, it has 
also sustained free and fair democratic elections, though every one has been won by the 
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) founded in 1961 by (amongst others) Seretse Khama 
who was president from 1966 until his death in 1980 and Quett Masire, president from 
1980 to 1998. Botswana has had no coups, no political instability, no civil wars, no 
threats of secession, and excellent, dedicated, uncorrupt leadership. 
There are things that have gone wrong in Botswana. There is still a great deal of poverty 
in rural areas, inequality is high (though falling, see Leith 2005: 17-18), the economy 
has been unable to diversify, and more important, the huge rate of HIV infection that the 
government is now fighting. I am not an epidemiologist and my understanding is that 
this disaster, which has hit so much of Southern Africa so hard, including the 
neighbouring countries of Zimbabwe, Swaziland and South Africa, is more to do with 
the nature of people’s sexual behaviour than the failure of governance. Given my 
expertise and my understanding of the relevant science, in this essay I shall focus 
                                                 
1   Tawana (Batawana) in the north-west, Ngwato (Bangwato, Bamangwato or Bagamangwato) in east- 
central areas, Kwena (Bakwena) and Ngwaketse (Bangwaketse), Kgatla (Bakgatla) and Tlokwa 
(Batlokwa), Malete (Balete or Bamalete) and Rolong (Barolong) in the south-east. 2 
mostly on economic growth. Nevertheless, the spread of HIV has severely undermined 
some of the benefits of growth, particular with respect to health and life expectancy. 
In any context, not just that of Sub-Saharan Africa, Botswana’s experience would 
stimulate the questions: why has economic growth has been so strong, and why has the 
country been so democratic and politically stable? The main focus of my paper is an 
examination of the determinants of economic growth in Botswana and what other 
countries can learn from it. But as the discussion will emphasize heavily the institutions 
of the society, it is natural also to discuss the success of democracy in the country.  
To begin thinking about the determinants of growth, let me make a distinction between 
the  proximate determinants and the fundamental  determinants. The proximate 
determinants of growth in Botswana are easily understood and have been well studied.2 
Increasing national income after independence was stimulated by a few positive shocks, 
such as the renegotiation of the South African Customs Union in 1969 which gave a 
much greater share of revenues to Botswana, but fundamentally it was based on the 
expansion of the cattle industry. Cattle products remained the largest export until 1978, 
when they were overtaken and subsequently swamped by diamonds. Since the 1970s 
income from diamond mining has account about one-third of national income and 
diamonds have made up about 75 per cent of exports. 
In addition to the basics of cattle and diamonds, Botswana has invested heavily in 
human capital, expanding both education and access to health care, and infrastructure. 
Investment in the ranching industry, in mining and in human capital has been facilitated 
by highly prudent and competent macroeconomic policy and stable property rights. 
There has been little inflation, no unsustainable fiscal deficits or international borrowing 
based on future diamond revenues, and no expropriations. It turns out that, proximately, 
growth in Botswana can be accounted for in very conventional ways. 
Table 1 
Botswana in comparative perspective 
  GDP per capita 
Avg. growth 









1997   US$  PPP$  1975-2005  1970  2005  Primary Secondary   
Botswana  5,846 12,387  5.9   8 57    85  60    48 
Zaire 123 714  -4.9    30  32          45 
Côte  d’Ivoire  900 1,648  -2.1  27  45   56  20   47 
Ethiopia  157 1,055 -0.2   9 16    61  18    52 
Ghana 485 2,480  0.7    29  48    65  37    59 
Lesotho  808 3,335  2.7   9 19    87  25    43 
Zambia  623 1,023  -1.8  30  35   89  26   41 
South Korea  16,309 22,029  6.0   41  81   99  90   78 
Mauritius 5,059 12,715  4.4    42 43    95  82    72 
Singapore 26,893 29,663  4.7    100  100          79 
Source:  Columns 1-3 and 6-8 from UNDP (HDI 2007), and columns 4-5 from World Bank (DWI 2007). 
                                                 
2   Important books on this include Colclough and McCarthy (1980), Harvey and Lewis (1990) and Leith 
(2005) and the essays in Salkin et al. (1997). 3 
Identifying the proximate determinants of economic success in Botswana, however, is 
only the first step in a satisfactory explanation because we must also examine the 
fundamental factors that determined these outcomes. Other countries with comparative 
advantage in ranching activities, such as Somalia or Sudan, have not been able to 
develop them into a dynamic export commodity. Moreover, the general pattern in   
Sub-Saharan Africa since independence is that rural sectors have been heavily 
discriminated against. Why not in Botswana? With respect to diamonds, their presence 
is hardly associated with development in Angola or Sierra Leone. The more natural 
association is between diamonds and the resource curse or the initiation of civil war and 
political conflict. Not only did these bad outcomes not happen in Botswana, but the 
country has been able to sustain a highly rational intertemporal path for the exploitation 
of the resource. The high rates of investment in education and health are also puzzling 
as is the prudence of macroeconomic policy. Investment in public goods and 
infrastructure has tended to be disastrous in post-independence Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) and most countries have staggered from one debt crisis to another with their 
budgets massively underwritten by international financial institutions and various donor 
countries. 
The puzzle, relative to Africa, is why has the diamond wealth not been squandered? 
Why did it not lead to political instability? Why has the rural sector not been 
discriminated against? What explains why macroeconomic policy has been so good? 
Why all this investment in public goods? 
These are the important questions to ask about Botswana and in this essay I attempt to 
answer them, mostly by putting them in some comparative context. Following 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2003) and Parsons and Robinson (2006) I shall 
characterize this as being an issue of governance. Botswana has had very good 
governance. Why?  
Three complementary factors have been important in Botswana’s success. The first is 
that the independent state benefited from a long process of state and institution 
formation inherited from the Tswana states. This was crucial for developing checks and 
balances on politicians and dispute resolution and creating good governance. The 
integrative structure of Tswana states also limited regionalism and facilitated the 
emergence of a national identity. Decisions at the formation of the modern state in the 
1960s built on this legacy. The second is that by historical chance, the eight Tswana 
states ended up controlling a single independent nation so that their institutions could 
help to determine national institutions without coming into conflict with other sets of 
institutions or interests, as happened in most other SSA countries (see Englebert 2000 
for the general argument). Moreover, the comparative neglect of the colony by the 
British administration allowed these institutions not only to persist, but to develop 
further in marked contrast to other experiences with indirect rule. Finally, elite interests 
were powerfully represented in early independence governments. Since elites were 
heavily invested in ranching, this led to a socially efficient development of the ranching 
industry and secure property rights which greatly facilitated the early growth of the 
economy.  
Like most social science I shall focus on the structural factors that seem to have 
influenced why certain options emerged and why certain decisions were made. 
Nevertheless, a striking thing about the history of Botswana is the leadership it has had. 
Reading the biographies of Seretse Khama (Tlou, Parsons and Henderson 1995) or the 4 
autobiography of Quett Masire (Masire 2006) one is struck by the incredibly pragmatic, 
serious and intelligent way these men addressed the problems of developing the 
institutions of the new state in the early 1960s. They wanted to build an independent, 
viable and prosperous nation and seem to have been completely uninterested in 
extracting rents for cementing themselves in power. This is an enormous contrast to 
what went on in most other African countries. It is significant, for instance, that the 
parliamentary institutions inherited from the colonial period have remained unchanged 
in Botswana in contrast to nearly all other African countries where political leaders 
quickly introduced presidential institutions after independence. But Botswana has not 
just had good leadership since the 1960s, it had good leadership in the nineteenth 
century as well. One example is the sustained attempt by the Ngwato chief Khama III, 
Seretse Khama’s grandfather, who ruled from 1875-1923, to modernize his state 
(Parsons 1977). He converted to Christianity and abandoned the role of chief as 
witchdoctor and priest which led to a secularization of political institutions. The first 
translation of the Bible into an African language was into Setswana. Another 
remarkable episode is the successful venture to London of three Tswana chiefs in 1895 
to see Queen Victoria and Joseph Chamberlain and foil the intentions of Cecil Rhodes 
to take over Bechuananland (Parsons 1998). Even the controversial figure of Tshkedi 
Khama, Seretse Khama’s uncle who acted as regent in Seretse’s youth, played an 
important role in fighting the imposition of indirect rule, discouraging labour 
recruitment to the mines in South Africa and blocking mineral prospecting inside the 
protectorate in the 1920s and 1930s (see Crowder 1985). Tlou, Parsons and Henderson 
(1995: 73) reproduce a British colonial document from the 1930s lamenting that: 
Tshekedi’s policy is obvious. It is to make the Bamangwato 
economically self-supporting, to develop a healthy cultural interest and 
provide, within the tribe’s own territory, a modernised tribal life which 
will prevent the drift of young men and women to the Union. 
Social scientists do not understand how to explain good leadership or why a society 
would persistently have good leadership in a continent surrounded by bad leadership. 
The tentative answer I myself would offer is that it is exactly the structure of Tswana 
institutions that created an environment which encouraged elites to make good 
decisions. As Comaroff (1978) showed in his study of the political history of the 
Rolong, though the Tswana in appearance had clear rules stipulating how the chiefship 
was to be inherited, in practice these rules were interpreted to remove bad rulers and 
allow talented candidates to become chief. As he puts it (Comaroff 1978: 16) 
The case material makes it clear that winning the chiefship is a matter of 
achievement, an achievement gained largely by controlling resources and 
capabilities which are extrinsic to formal institutional arrangements. Yet 
such outcomes are rationalized in entirely ascriptive terms: the successful 
competitor becomes the rightful heir. 
Comaroff’s essay makes it clear that we should not think of good leadership as an 
exogenous factor driving Botswana’s economic success, it is an intrinsic part of the 
historical divergence of Tswana political institutions. 
The essay proceeds as follows. In the next section I briefly discuss in abstract the forces 
that lead to good or bad economic policies and the conventional wisdom about why 
policies have typically been so bad in Africa since independence. Section 3 then asks 5 
why these forces have not applied in Botswana. Section 4 focuses on the questions of 
what sort of lessons can be drawn from the development experience of Botswana that 
would be useful for other countries. 
2  The causes of bad economic policies 
Botswana has had good economic policies, investment in public goods and human 
capital, a stable macroeconomic environment, a rational exploitation of its comparative 
advantage in ranching, and a rational exploitation of its diamond wealth. These 
outcomes were primarily the result of choices by politicians, so we have to ask why 
politicians made these decisions. To a public finance economist, this would not be a 
puzzle, since exploiting comparative advantage or investing in human capital is what a 
country is supposed to do. Unfortunately, the reality, particularly in SSA, is different. 
This is because policies are chosen by politicians (or previously colonial 
administrators!) who, unlike benevolent social planners in public finance, have the 
objective of winning and maintaining power, not maximizing prosperity or the growth 
rate of society. The viewpoint of political economy is that to the extent that policies 
chosen are socially efficient, this will be because politicians are constrained or induced 
to take action that promotes the welfare of society. However, there is no presumption 
that what is privately rational for politicians will coincide with the welfare of society 
and indeed these two factors have rarely coincided in post-independence Africa. 
The literature on political economy now contains many mechanisms which will lead 
political rational policies to deviate from economically rational ones. Rather than survey 
this literature I want to focus on the paradigm which has developed in African studies to 
explain poor economic policies and which encapsulates many of the most important 
mechanisms.  
Bad economic policies arise from particular structures of political incentives or 
particular strategies of rule which are common in Africa. The most common 
characterization of an African ‘strategy of rule’ is called patrimonialism, neo-
patrimonialism, or clientalism. Neopatrimonialism (according to Bratton and   
van de Walle 1997: 62) can be characterized in the following way: 
the right to rule in neopatrimonial regimes is ascribed to a person rather 
than to an office, despite the official existence of a written constitution. 
One individual  ...  dominates the state apparatus and stands above its 
laws. Relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a formal political 
and administrative system, and officials occupy bureaucratic positions 
less to perform public service  ...  than to acquire personal wealth and 
status. Although state functionaries receive an official salary, they also 
enjoy access to various forms of illicit rents … which constitute … an 
entitlement of office. The chief executive and his inner circle undermine 
the effectiveness of the nominally modern state administration by using it 
for systematic patronage and clientelist practices in order to maintain 
political order. 
It is quite clear how such a strategy of rule would be inimical to good economic 
policies. First, as Bates (1981) points out, one cannot engage in clientelism by providing 6 
public goods. By definition, public goods benefit everyone, those who support the 
regime and those that do not. To be effective, patronage has to be targeted to some 
individuals and withheld from others. One can only achieve this with private goods. 
Thus clientelism leads to an endemic and fundamental undersupply of public goods 
whether these are macro public goods, like fiscal prudence or low inflation, or micro 
public goods such as roads or investment in education and health. Second, note also that 
clientelism is inconsistent with such basic principles as equality before the law and 
universalistic principles such as the protection of private property rights. In a 
neopatrimonial regime there are no such concerns as universalistic criteria. Third, the 
fact that so much clientelism takes the form of employment in the bureaucracy 
completely undermines public sector efficiency. People have jobs not because of their 
skills or merits, but because of their political connections. Such people cannot be given 
high powered incentives or motivated to work and public sector jobs become insecure.  
The antithesis of neopatrimonialism is good governance. Governance is defined by 
Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999: 1) at the World Bank as: 
the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised. This includes (i) the process by which governments are 
selected, monitored and replaced, (ii) the capacity of the government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (iii) the respect 
of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and 
social interactions amongst them. 
The available evidence suggests that Botswana has had very good governance. The 
columns of Table 2 record some basic relevant data from the World Bank’s Governance 
project. The Governance project has collected comparable measures of different   
 
Table 2 
Estimates of governance 







quality Rule  of  law 
Control of 
corruption 
    Panel A: Sub-Saharan Africa     
Mauritius 0.85  0.76  0.60 0.57 0.79 0.41 
South Africa  0.74  0.18  0.72 0.48 0.15 0.32 
Ghana  0.50 0.22  -0.14 0.0  -0.08  -0.17 
Botswana  0.49 0.84 0.70 0.48 0.67 0.90 
Senegal -0.02  -0.18  -0.34 -0.35 -0.39 -0.51 
Kenya  -0.06 -1.10 -0.59 -0.21 -0.98 -0.94 
Tanzania  -0.15 -0.07 -0.42 -0.37 -0.45 -0.45 
Malawi -0.20  -0.01  -0.59 -0.51 -0.39 -0.74 
Zambia -0.26  0.24  -0.59 -0.48 -0.64 -0.60 
Singapore  -0.43 1.17 2.41 1.87 1.79 2.20 
Uganda  -0.47 -1.15 -0.40 -0.20 -0.54  0.76 
Nigeria -0.54  -2.07  -0.93 -0.89 -1.20 -1.01 
Burundi -0.80  -1.42 -1.34 -1.21 -1.16 -1.06 
Cameroon -0.94  -0.39  -0.87 -0.71 -1.09 -0.93 
Angola -1.11  -0.46  -1.15 -1.0  -1.35 -1.12 
Ethiopia -1.19  -1.72  -0.45 -0.90 -0.54 -0.70 
Côte d’Ivoire  -1.26 -2.12 -1.37 -0.98 -1.54 -1.09 
Zimbabwe -1.54  -1.30  -1.48 -2.24 -1.67 -1.25 
       Table  2  cont’d7 
Table 2 (cont’d) 









quality Rule  of  law 
Control of 
corruption 
    Panel B: Other countries     
Belgium 1.44  0.75  1.59 1.48 1.52 1.45 
United Kingdom  1.38  0.56 1.70 1.86 1.75 1.89 
France 1.27  0.51  1.30 1.15 1.32 1.32 
United States  1.09  0.30 1.62 1.45 1.59 1.44 
Spain 1.05  0.04  1.00 1.15 1.12 1.16 
Japan 0.93  1.02  1.32 1.05 1.39 1.20 
Brazil 0.41  -0.22  -0.12 -0.04 -0.44 -0.24 
India  0.38 -1.01  0.03 -0.22  0.10 -0.39 
Argentina  0.33  0.14 -0.14 -0.77 -0.50 -0.40 
Colombia  -0.28 -1.65  0.03  0.21 -0.57 -0.28 
Vietnam  -1.61 0.31  -0.41 0.43  -0.53  -0.69 
Source:  World Bank (Worldwide Governance Indicators). 
dimensions of governance from many countries and the aggregated scores lie between  
-2.5 and +2.5 with higher meaning better governance. Panels A and B of Table 2 show a 
remarkable picture where basic aspects of governance in Botswana, such as the rule of 
law or the efficiency of the government, are on a par with western European countries. 
The same picture emerges in the last column, which reports data on corruption from 
Transparency International. Corruption in Botswana is minimal. 
As shown by Table 2, Botswana has had good governance and it has not suffered from 
neopatrimonial rule. In cross-country data we know that good governance, at least 
broadly interpreted, is strongly associated with prosperity (Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson 2001). This is the most useful starting point for a deeper understanding 
Botswana’s success. But my approach here is not to consider good governance as 
something which is technocratic ally achieved. Rather it is the outcome of a very 
different type of political equilibrium from the neopatrimonial one which generates bad 
governance. It is the very different structure of politics in Botswana that has led to the 
provision of both macro and micro public goods and the rational exploitation of 
diamonds and it is this which starkly distinguishes Botswana from nearly all of SSA. 
3  What induced good Governance in Botswana? 
I now address the question of why there has not been neopatrimonial rule in Botswana. 
The question of the origins of neopatrimonial rule in the African context has been 
addressed by Herbst (2000) and Bates (2001) building on the work of Max Weber and 
many others who studied the origins of state institutions in Europe. This literature sees 
patrimonialism as a very basic form of rule prior to the formation of modern state 
institutions. The eradication of patrimonialism comes as part and parcel of the process 
of state formation and the creation of modern rational-legal institutions such as a 
meritocratic bureaucracy. According to this literature, good governance is created by 
institutional development, particularly state formation (creation of bureaucracy, 
impartial legal system, rule of law, depersonalization of state revenues and resources, 
institutional limitations on the exercise and use of political power). The persistence of 8 
neopatrimonialism is therefore the outcome of the stunted process of state formation in 
Africa studied most intensively by Herbst.3  
This perspective suggests that the key to unravelling the puzzling absence of neo-
patrimonialism in Botswana might come from the historical evolution of state 
institutions there. Is it possible that these took a different form from those elsewhere in 
other parts of Africa? I think the answer to this question is yes. Historically the Tswana 
developed a state with relatively limited chiefs and with a political structure that was 
able to integrate other groups, such as the Kalanga, into the state via wards. Schapera 
(1940) describes how the ward system worked. He also describes how tribal policy was 
conducted: 
all matters of tribal policy are dealt with finally before a general 
assembly of the adult males in the chief’s kgotla (council place). Such 
meetings are very frequently held … among the topics discussed ... are 
tribal disputes, quarrels between the chief and his relatives, the 
imposition of new levies, the undertaking of new public works, the 
promulgation of new decrees by the chief … it is not unknown for the 
tribal assembly to overrule the wishes of the chief. Since anyone may 
speak, these meetings enable him to ascertain the feelings of the people 
generally, and provide the latter with an opportunity of stating their 
grievances. If the occasion calls for it, he and his advisers may be taken 
severely to task, for the people are seldom afraid to speak openly and 
frankly (Schapera 1940: 72). 
According to an often quoted Tswana proverb, ‘the king is king by the grace of the 
people’ (kgosi ke kgosi ka morafe) (see Schapera 1938; Gulbrandsen 1995 for more on 
this). 
We do not really understand why the Tswana developed these institutions historically 
(Tlou 1998; Tlou and Campbell 1999; Parsons 1999 for discussion of what we do know) 
but they do seem to have been important both in selecting and checking leaders and 
seem to have played an important part in paving the way to an accountable and effective 
modern state. 
Just as important as having innovated such institutions, Tswana chiefs protected and 
developed them in the nineteenth century under a series of threats which came first from 
the expansion of the Boers in the Southern African hinterland, then from the British 
South Africa Company and Cecil Rhodes, and finally from the British Empire. Tswana 
political elites attempted to maintain their independence by defensively modernizing 
and adapting to these new circumstances.  
The Tswana were not alone, either in the types of political institutions they evolved, or 
in their desire to modernize. However, what is unique about Botswana is the way that 
such a group came to occupy the whole of a national territory and managed to fend off 
the most pernicious effects of colonialism. This contrasts with other parts of Sub-
Saharan Africa. For instance, though the borders of the modern state of Rwanda 
corresponds quite well to the traditional polity of the Nyiginya Kingdom, the Nyiginya 
                                                 
3  See Robinson (2002) for some reservations about the argument. 9 
political institutions had developed in a completely different way historically with a 
much more powerful king and warrior class and being much more hierarchical and 
socially stratified (see Vansina 2004). The Nyiginya completely lacked the political 
institutions which were to play such as important role in modern Botswana. It is also 
interesting to compare the Tswana with the Barotse in Zambia who also undertook 
defensive modernization of their institutions but were crushed by the creation of 
Northern Rhodesia. Even more striking is the experience of the Tswana across the South 
African border in Bophutatswana or the Basutho in Lesotho. The Basutho share very 
similar cultural roots to the Tswana and this extends to language and political 
institutions but the latter were decisively undermined by the British in an attempt to 
mobilize labour for the expanding mines of the Rand. 
Out of this process of state formation also came ethnic homogeneity. Much is made of 
the fact that Botswana is today ethno-linguistically homogeneous and this has been 
argued to be an important independent variable in explaining the political stability of 
Botswana. Though one can today see the arbitrary effect of boundaries and high levels 
of ethno-linguistic fragmentation as a cause of political instability in Africa, we can also 
think of this as an outcome of the absence of the formation of a state. A fascinating 
comparison is with the work of Weber (1976) on the creation of modern French ethno-
linguistic homogeneity. As Weber points out, at the start of the nineteenth century 
France was a patchwork of many different languages and ethnicities, with few groups 
speaking French as a first language or feeling allegiance to the central state in Paris. 
Moreover, many of these groups straddled international boundaries. However, the 
expansion and consolidation of the central state and the imposition of a uniform 
educational curriculum gradually led Provencals on the French side of the border came 
to see themselves as French while those on the Italian side came to see themselves as 
Italians. This had a lot to do with the pattern of political institution building in these 
countries. A very similar process has taken place in Botswana over the last 50 years and 
I would argue that it is the organization of the Tswana states which mostly accounts for 
the relatively homogenous nature of society, probably no more than 50 per cent of 
people in Botswana are actually Tswana. The last census to ask questions about 
ethnicity was in 1946. Schapera’s (1952) tabulation of the returns from the Ngwato 
reserve, for example, shows that people who were identified as being pure Ngwato 
made up less than 20 per cent of the population! There are many non-Tswana groups 
who did not speak Tswana. Leith (2005) shows that once you re-compute ethnic 
homogeneity using these data Botswana stops looking like an outlier in Africa. 
The formation of state institutions in Botswana built on the historical legacy through 
defensive modernization. But the development of the state was also in the self-interest 
of elites given expanding economic opportunities. Political elites and particularly chiefs 
were heavily invested in the country’s most important economic activity, ranching 
(Cohen 1979). This gave them a strong incentive to promote rational state institutions 
and private property. An outstanding illustration of this is the way the Botswana Meat 
Corporation (BMC) functioned (Samatar 1999). The BMC was the marketing board 
which controlled the exports of ranching industry and as noted above, meat exports 
were the basis of the early independence economy. As Bates (1981) so convincingly 
shows, the poor performance of rural African economies after independence was 
because marketing boards for exports were captured by undemocratic political elites 
whose support came from urban areas. They therefore used the marketing boards to levy 
very high implicit rates of taxation on farmers by paying them prices for their crops 
which were far below world levels. The BMC was completely different, possibly 10 
because Botswana was a democracy, but most likely because of the interests of those 
with political power. Unlike in most parts of Africa, it was those who investing in the 
rural economy who had political power and they used this power to rationally develop 
the industry, stimulating economic growth in the immediate wake of independence. 
The modernization of state institutions continued in the 1960s where the crucial 
transition to formal independence took place.4 In the process of creating these 
institutions Seretse Khama benefited from being the hereditary chief of the largest 
Tswana tribe (even though he had renounced his chiefship in his fight to return to 
Botswana after marrying a white woman). This continuity of authority no doubt played 
an important role in promoting the legitimacy of the post-independence state. Yet 
Khama and the BDP also transformed authority. They created the House of Chiefs, but 
gave it no power, and they removed the local powers of chiefs while at the same time 
giving them positions on local government institutions that allocated resources (yet 
were accountable, etc.). 
My argument then is that one can understand why Botswana has been so successful 
precisely by appealing to the literature about how European states have been so 
successful. Botswana became successful because it built strong and accountable state 
institutions. Though the details of history are different, the pattern both of important 
institutional idiosyncrasies historically5 and the building of institutions are qualitatively 
very similar. This is a highly unusual pattern in Africa, but it happened in Botswana.  
What role did democracy play in all this? As with the European experience I would see 
democracy as an outcome of this process and co-evolving with the building of state 
institutions, rather than as a critical independent source of variation. For example, 
democracy will tend to persist when the stakes from power are relatively low in the 
sense that groups that wield power in democracy and political elites are limited in what 
they can do to others and face checks and balances (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Yet 
one can imagine that institutions such as the kgotla played exactly this role, so that the 
same institutional structure which facilitated economic growth also led to democracy 
(see Acemoglu et al. 2008 for this general argument). 
4  Botswana as a role model 
I have now identified several factors that seem to have been important in explaining the 
rapid growth of Botswana. The proximate causes have been very good governance and 
choice of economic and social policies. More fundamentally I have tried to argue these 
have stemmed from the historical evolution of the institutions of Tswana states which 
forced post-independence politicians to function in an environment very different from 
in most of Sub-Saharan Africa. The reasons these institutions came to exert such a 
powerful force is undoubtedly because by chance the territory more or less controlled 
by the eight Tswana states ended up as an independent country and because it was 
neglected by the British. Finally, the political influence of elites was important because 
of their vested interest in developing ranching and in stable property rights. 
                                                 
4   See Fawcus and Tilbury (2000) on this crucial period. 
5   See Ertman (1997) on the European case. 11 
Nevertheless, I emphasize that as in the 19
th century, these were modernizing elites. The 
pre-independence negotiations of the 1960s stripped the chiefs of many of their powers 
to determine the local allocation of resources, such as the right to all stray cattle and to 
unpaid labour services from their tribesmen. However, customary law was maintained 
in parallel with British common law and the chiefs did maintain a lot of power with 
respect to legal decisions. It appears to be the evolution of political institutions that can 
explain why Botswana has not regressed into the type of patrimonial and clientelistic 
political equilibrium which has been so prevalent and resilient elsewhere in Africa.  
In what sense, then, is Botswana a role model for country success? On one hand it is a 
perfect model. It suggests that even starting form terrible initial conditions, adopting the 
type of economic policies advocated by mainstream economists and by the World Bank 
can be very successful. Even this is an interesting lesson given that so many detractors 
of the international financial institutions, like Easterly (2001) or Sachs (2005), claim 
that they have continuously promoted foolish policies. The evidence from Botswana 
suggests that had African countries done what was suggested, they would now all be a 
lot richer. Moreover, Botswana got richer slowly, step by step, it did not need a ‘big 
push’ just a cumulation of little sensible things. Importantly, the Botswanan experience 
is also one of orthodoxy. Other critics of international financial institutions, such as 
Hausmann and Rodrik (2006), claim that poor countries need to experiment with 
heterodox policies, such as subsidizing industry. But this is not what Botswana did. The 
experience of Botswana suggests the simple interpretation that contrary to the claims of 
those who praise heterodoxy, the real problem in Sub-Saharan Africa is that countries 
have not adopted the orthodox policies which have been recommended to them. This is 
why they have not grown. The issue is not finding the binding market failure, it is trying 
to achieve an institutional and political environment which is conducive to making 
socially desirable choices. Without solving these problems, promoting industrial policy 
will probably have the consequences we have already seen in Africa, of creating more 
opportunities for rent seeking and clientelism, and which were so devastatingly exposed 
by Killick (1978) in the case of Ghana. These are valuable lessons as economists and 
policymakers search for alternative paradigms in the post-Washington consensus world.  
At another level of course, one could argue that Botswana is not such a good model. 
This is because, as is clear from my discussion, the reasons that Botswana was able to 
adopt these good policies are a complex outcome of history, institutional building and 
interests. The circumstances are very different in the Congo, or Sierra Leone, and this is 
why they have ignored the advice of economists or the World Bank. But we cannot 
change history or re-draw the boundaries of African states. Nor can we easily alter what 
interests do or do not have power through the political system. However, I do believe 
that there are some practical lessons that can be learned with respect to the development 
of state institutions. When the post-independence state was constructed in Botswana in 
the 1960s, it was done in the shadow of Tswana institutions of dispute resolution and 
consultation. Chiefs were not able to make arbitrary decisions concerning their tribes 
without consultation and it is clear that the members of the Legislative Council behaved 
in the same way. As laws were passed and decisions made, Masire and Khama would 
travel the country appearing before kgotlas to explain, discuss and justify decisions. As 
the national capital was constructed, new kgotlas were built to cement the old in the 
new. A series of decisions were made which helped to build the national state. A simple 
one was making Setswana and English the only languages that were taught in school. 12 
Mineral rights were vested in the nation and not the tribe. Land laws were changed so 
that people could be allocated land outside their own tribal areas.6 These decisions, and 
many others like them, built the modern state and its institutions. This is why policy has 
been good and clientelism so scarce in Botswana. I have argued that the probable reason 
why these decisions were made in Botswana was because of the way they built on 
existing institutions. But this does not mean that such decisions cannot be made or 
encouraged elsewhere.  
To see in a practical way how these lessons are useful, consider the reconstruction of the 
state in Sierra Leone following the end of the civil war in 2002. One of the first 
initiatives the new government undertook with the support of the British was to re-
instate chiefship as the crucial local political institution. Chiefs in Sierra Leone are 
elected for life by an electoral college based on a franchise of taxpayers and have to be 
selected from a few ‘ruling families’ whose origins trace to the creation of indirect rule 
by the British. They have large powers in addition to their traditional roles in allocating 
land and custodians of customary law. For instance, they can command unpaid labour 
services and they play important roles in influencing national elections. The Botswana 
experience suggests that reinstating the powers and prerogatives of chiefs in Sierra 
Leone was almost certainly a mistake and impedes the ability of the country to construct 
the modern state which it so desperately needs.7  
The lesson here I think is that instead of focusing on policies or outcomes, reform 
should focus on the structure of state institutions and how they can be altered to form a 
national state. Some of this may clash with other notions, such as the need to respect 
linguistic or cultural diversity. The experience of Botswana, and probably that of 
Europe historically, suggests however that such respect may come at the expense of 
political instability and conflict. 
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